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Prologue
Strategic considerations of players in the theory of noncooperative games [20] represent one of the classical examples of reasoning under uncertainty. In this paper we focus on a particular class of games, where the goals of players can be expressed as a formula of a formal language. Typically we assume that the formula represents a claim and the goal of one player is to show that the claim is true, while the goal of the other one is to disprove it. Truth or falsity of the claim depend on parameters which players can control, such as the values of atomic formulas in the case the language in question is that of propositional logic. Each of the players can influence values of some parameters, while the remaining ones are under the control of the other player. Informally, we can imagine that a player makes a statement "there is a situation, which I can demonstrate by choosing appropriate values for the parameters under my control, in which the claim is true/false (independently of the remaining parameters)".
This kind of game is well-known in literature. In [8] the assertion in question is expressed in classical propositional logic and parameters are Boolean variables divided into disjoint sets, each of which is under the control of one of the players.
From the logical point of view, we shall deal with a more general set-up in which the goals of players might generally be satisfied only up to some degree. Reasoning with claims evaluated on a non-dichotomic scale is the natural domain of many-valued logics [7] , which offer versatile tools to model the statements which are not just true or false, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2014.04.009 0888-613X/© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. but which can take an intermediate truth value. Although we are considering games of two players with each of them controlling only a single propositional variable, the complexity of strategic considerations increases radically as the space of strategies is a continuum. This is in sharp contrast with the finite space considered in Boolean games. Marchioni and Wooldridge [11] present a generalization of Boolean games towards many-valued logics similar to our approach-the goals of players are represented by a formula in Łukasiewicz logic. In comparison to our approach they admit only finitely many truth values, but allow any finite number of players. Moreover, the game they introduce need not be strictly competitive.
The extension to uncountably-many truth-values has two important features from the viewpoint of game modeling and representation. First, the continuum of truth values enables us to capture a much larger space of payoff functions than with the Boolean games. Second, it also introduces a new kind of uncertainty into game-theoretical reasoning. Probability is standard equipment used in game theory-it appears naturally when the notion of a mixed strategy is introduced as randomizing over deterministic choices of (pure) strategies. Introducing many-valued framework, on the other hand, provides a broader scale for approximate reasoning about strategies: the players have to consider combining probability with graded truth values.
Introduction
Several interesting game-theoretic models arose from the investigations of reasoning under more than two degrees of truth, such as the bookmaking model over Łukasiewicz formulas [13] and the logical characterization of coherence [3] . In this paper we are going to develop a two-player strategic game in which the payoff functions are directly associated with formulas in infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic. The free n-generated MV-algebra of Łukasiewicz logic [2, 7] is the MV-algebra of McNaughton functions, which are many-valued analogues of Boolean functions. The expressive power of McNaughton functions is greater than that of Boolean functions so that many interesting strategic games can be expressed by formulas in Łukasiewicz logic. Since the associated utility functions are continuous and piecewise linear with integer coefficients, a Nash equilibrium exists by Glicksberg's Theorem [5] , which is an infinite-dimensional generalization of the Nash Theorem [14] . However, the whole class of piecewise linear functions is not amenable to the known computational techniques for strategic games [17, 18] . The main open questions are (i) whether finitely supported equilibria exist for each McNaughton function, (ii) provided that the answer to (i) is affirmative, are there algorithms for computing such equilibria? It is worth mentioning that "To find a computational technique of general applicability for zero-sum two-person games with infinite sets of strategies" was mentioned by Kuhn and Tucker as an interesting open problem in [10] . We will solve both problems (i) and (ii) for a special kind of McNaughton function whose domain allows for decomposition into an orthogonal grid subdividing the hypercube, where a suitable reduction to a matrix game can be used. Finiteness of the mixed equilibria means that the players can select their actions from the finite set with probability one. This paper is structured as follows. Basic notions concerning Łukasiewicz logic and its functional representation are recalled in Section 2. The game model is investigated and examples are given in Section 3. In Section 4 we state the main result about the existence of finitely supported equilibria for a particular family of McNaughton functions (Theorem 4.2). Finally, the challenges for further research are mentioned in Section 5.
Basic notions
We repeat basic definitions and results concerning infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic. The apparatus of polyhedral geometry, which paves the way for effective processing of McNaughton functions, is further developed. The reader is invited to consult [2] for details. Throughout the paper we use the standard notions and tools of convex geometry-see [22] , for example.
Łukasiewicz logic
We consider only finitely many propositional variables A 1 , . . . , A n . Formulas ϕ, ψ, . . . are then constructed from these variables and the truth-constant0 using the following basic connectives: negation ¬ and strong disjunction ⊕. The set of all such formulas is denoted by FORM n .
The standard semantics for connectives of Łukasiewicz logic is given by the corresponding operations of the standard MV-algebra, which is just the real unit interval [0, 1] endowed with constant falsum0 and the operations of negation ¬ and strong disjunction ⊕ defined as:
Derived connectives are further introduced. They are listed together with their standard semantics and the same symbol is used to denote both the connective and the corresponding binary operation on [0, 1]:
Operations and ⊕ are also known as Łukasiewicz t-norm and Łukasiewicz t-conorm, respectively [9] . A valuation is a mapping ν: 
Due to the standard completeness theorem [2, Proposition 4.5.5], we may say that the MV-algebra M n is the Lindenbaum algebra of Łukasiewicz logic over n variables.
Since every valuation ν is completely determined by its restriction to the propositional variables ν
n , it follows that ν is mapped to a unique point
n . Accordingly, M n can be rendered as an algebra of functions with operations ¬ and ⊕ defined pointwise and with0 being the constant zero function.
It is easy to prove by induction on the complexity of the formula ϕ that each function [ϕ] is continuous and piecewise linear such that each linear piece has integer coefficients. The sufficiency of these conditions is the content of the McNaughton Theorem. [12] 
McNaughton theorem. (See
.) Let f : [0, 1] n → [0, 1]. Then f ∈ M n
iff f is continuous and piecewise linear with each linear
piece having integer coefficients.
McNaughton functions
Each function in M n is called an (n-variable) McNaughton function. Before we proceed further, we need to recall basic geometric facts about McNaughton functions. To this end, a few notions from convex geometry will be useful [22] . By a convex polytope in R n we mean the convex hull of finitely many points in R n . Throughout the paper, we omit the adjective "convex" so that we write just "polytope". Every nonempty polytope A in R n must have at least one vertex, a point v ∈ A that cannot be expressed as a non-trivial convex combination of points in A. By V (A) we denote the set of all vertices of A.
We say that a polytope
n is a nonempty finite family P of polytopes in R n such that the face of every polytope A ∈ P belongs to P, and the intersection of any two polytopes A, B ∈ P is a common face of both A and B. We say that a polyhedral complex P is rational whenever each polytope A ∈ P is rational. A support of P is the set |P| = A∈P A. A polyhedral complex P is a subdivision of P when |P| = |P | and each polytope of P is contained in some polytope of P. 
n since it is a set containing solutions of the finite system of linear inequalities with integer coefficients. Given f ∈ M n , put
and consider the collection P( f ) of all faces of the polytopes in P ( f ):
{B | B is a face of A}.
As mentioned in [2, p. 65], the family P( f ) is a rational polyhedral complex such that for each polytope A ∈ P( f ) there is an index i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} for which the functions f and f i coincide over A. We can refer to polytopes in P( f ) as linear regions of f . We write V ( f ) in place of V (P( f )) without the risk of confusion and the points x ∈ V ( f ) are called the vertices of f . 
Then f is a two-variable McNaughton function-see Fig. 1 . This function has exactly three linear pieces:
and f 3 (x, y) = 1, which give rise to the polyhedral complex P( f ) also depicted in Fig. 1 .
Strategic games with McNaughton payoffs
Game theory admits a presentation of games in an extensive or a strategic form. Extensive games consist of a series of players' moves, which is in fact a series of decision problems with (possibly incomplete) information about the previous moves of the other players. Strategic games, on the other hand, represent games in a concise form. It is assumed that each player makes one decision at a time and chooses a global strategy for the whole game independently of the other players and without information about their decisions.
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be a finite set whose elements are called players. Each player i ∈ N can adopt a strategy x i , an element of a possibly infinite set A i , in order to achieve his/her goal. A strategic game is a triple Γ = (N, (A i ) i∈N , ( f i ) i∈N ), where f i : × j∈N A j → R is a payoff function of player i ∈ N, which determines the payoff f i (x 1 , . . . , x n ) provided that player i chooses strategy x i ∈ A i and the other players select strategies (x j ) j∈N\{i} ∈ × j∈N\{i} A j . A finite game is a strategic game Γ in which each strategy set A i has finite cardinality. Such games have been the subject of study since the pioneering work in game theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern and there are many solution concepts and effective computational methods for finite games. In contrast with finite games requiring only a finite amount of information to describe the players' strategies, we are going to analyze a particular class of infinite strategic games where each player makes strategic choices from the real unit interval [0, 1]. We will detail our assumptions as follows. 
The conditions above mean that every strategic game Γ f is a game of two players, each of whom selects a real number from [0, 1] as his/her strategy. Moreover, the game is a constant-sum one, Besides their logical contents, the games with McNaughton functions capture strategic conflicts in which continuous piecewise linear payoff functions are natural. We will illustrate such situations with examples. 
, y ∈ {0, 1}. 2. f E (x, y) .
Fig. 3. f R (x, y).
Second, the function f E is determined by linear interpolation elsewhere on the unit square. Then f E ∈ M 2 . The game given by f E captures the following simplified version of Hotelling's electoral competition model [19] . Assume that Players 1 and 2 are candidates choosing policies x, y ∈ [0, 1] in order to win the elections. Each citizen has preferences over policies and votes for either Player 1 or 2. In the latest poll, the preferences show that Player 1 1. cannot attract extreme right or extreme left voters at all, 2. is preferred by centrist voters whenever Player 2 chooses any of the two extreme policies, 3. ties with Player 2 if both adopt the centrist policy.
The values f E (x, y) express the ratio of votes for Player 1-see Fig. 2 . (Fig. 3) , which is known as the Chang distance [2] . The corresponding formula is a many-valued counterpart of the Boolean symmetric difference since Which strategies should players choose in order to maximize their payoffs? The standard answer to this fundamental problem requires introducing the main solution concept of game theory. 
When both players adopt the Nash equilibrium strategies x * and y * , respectively, then each of them avoids the situation with incurring a smaller payoff than that guaranteed by the value f (x * , y * ). If a player's strategy is a part of a certain Nash equilibrium, then we say that the strategy is optimal for the player. For every game Γ f , we denote
For any (x * , y * ) ∈ NE( f ), the number f (x * , y * ) is called the value of game Γ f .
Example 3.5 (Example 3.2 contd.).
It can easily be verified that the only pair of optimal strategies in the game Γ f E is (
)}. Indeed, the center of the square is the only saddle point of f E .
We will see later that existence of a Nash equilibrium in a strategic game Γ f is, in general, not guaranteed. However, if NE( f ) = ∅, then the assumption that f is a McNaughton function implies a special form of this set.
Proposition 3.6 (Properties of Nash equilibria)
. Let f ∈ M 2 . If the strategic game Γ f admits at least one Nash equilibrium, then: 
Since the vertices of f are rational points and the linear pieces of function f have integer coefficients, the value v is necessarily rational.
3. It is well-known that the set of all Nash equilibria of a constant-sum game is a Cartesian product, that is, NE( f ) = X × Y , for some X, Y ⊆ [0, 1]. Let v be the value of game Γ f and consider the set M y * = {x ∈ X | f (x, y * ) = v} for a fixed optimal strategy y * of Player 2. Since f is continuous piecewise linear with finitely many linear pieces, we have
The endpoints of each interval must be rational since the value is rational and the function f has integer coefficients. The conclusion follows by observing that X = M y * for every choice of the optimal y * and by repeating the same construction for Y .
Suppose that dim(NE(
Since the value of the game Γ f is uniquely determined and dim(NE( f )) = 2, the function f must be constant over NE( f ), and the number v must satisfy v ∈ {0, 1}. Indeed, otherwise the function f would have a linear piece given by a real constant c ∈ (0, 1), and a contradiction would follow from the definition of McNaughton function f (all pieces have integer coefficients). 2
Observe that the previous theorem gives a very easy but inefficient method for finding a Nash equilibrium in Γ f : the exhaustive search over the vertices in V ( f ). However, this technique may fail badly when Γ f has no equilibria-examples of McNaughton functions f with this property are not difficult to find. Since the strategy space [0, 1] is uncountable, it is theoretically possible that any measurable set of strategies can be adopted with nonzero probability. Thus it is natural to define a mixed strategy as a Borel probability measure μ on [0, 1]. 
where μ × ν denotes the product measure on [0, 1] 2 . If one of the players, say Player 1, uses a pure strategy x ∈ [0, 1], then we may identify x with the Dirac measure δ x and (3) becomes
Throughout the rest of this article the notation E f (x, ν) is used instead of E f (δ x , ν) above. We say that a pair of Borel probability measures (μ * , ν * ) ∈ 2 is a mixed-strategy equilibrium if
We can test the property (4) with respect to the pure strategies only.
Proposition 3.8. Let f ∈ M 2 . Then the following assertions are equivalent:
2 is a mixed-strategy equilibrium in Γ f .
For every pair of pure strategies
Proof. The only non-trivial direction is a direct consequence of weak * -compactness of the space and the fact that all convex combinations of Dirac measures are weak * -dense in tence of the equilibrium pair is a direct consequence of Glicksberg's Theorem [5] , which requires only compactness of the strategy spaces and continuity of the payoff functions. Therefore we obtain the following existence result.
Theorem 3.9. Let f ∈ M 2 . Then the game Γ f has a mixed strategy equilibrium.
While the concept of mixed strategies is general enough to provide a solution to any game Γ f , the equilibrium pair (μ * , ν * ) is not amenable to a direct calculation as the proof of Glicksberg's Theorem is not constructive. As far as the authors' knowledge goes, in general, there is no algorithm for computing the mixed equilibria in games with continuous payoff functions over the unit interval. The existing methods are well-tailored to very specific classes of functions, such as polynomial and separable games [15] , which do not include the class of games with McNaughton functions discussed in this paper. Therefore, in order to recover mixed equilibria in the examples below, we will first rely on a combination of a guess and good luck. (δ 0 + δ 1 ) is optimal for both players so that the value of the game is
Another equilibrium forms the pair (μ * , 1 2 ). Note that the optimal strategies are not symmetric since ( 1 2 , μ * ) is not a pair of equilibrium strategies. We can show that the uniform distribution-the Lebesgue measure λ on [0, 1]-is never optimal for Player 1: indeed, we have Fig. 4. g R (x, y) .
for every y such that 0 < y < 1. On the contrary, the pair (μ * , λ) is in equilibrium since
, for every y ∈ [0, 1], and
While the game Γ f R given by the Chang distance is fair since its value is equal to 1 2 , the two players' sets of optimal strategies are not the same. Below we will introduce a more convincing continuous generalization to the game of Matching pennies: the payoff must measure the degree of similarity and dissimilarity at the same time. 
in which the double appearance of (ϕ ↔ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ψ) is for normalization purposes only. In game Γ g R it is optimal for each player to select a pure strategy in [0, 1] according to the uniform distribution over the unit interval. Thus one Nash equilibrium pair is (λ, λ) and the value of Γ g R is E g R (λ, λ) = (μ a,b , μ a,b ) is equilibrium.
All the examples of games shown so far reveal the existence of a special pair of optimal strategies in which the players randomize among finitely many pure strategies. Specifically, we say that a mixed strategy μ ∈ is finitely supported if the support of μ is finite, that is,
The games in which optimal strategies μ exist such that (5) holds true have convenient algorithmic properties, since processing Borel probability measures is in general a very difficult task. It is known that not every game with continuous payoff functions admits at least one pair of finitely supported strategies [6] . On the other hand, the optimal finitely supported strategies are present in the class of separable games for which even computational algorithms exist [17, 18] . Deciding whether a given game over the unit square has a pair of optimal finitely supported strategies thus remains a difficult task. Fig. 6 . Grid G(g) and complex P(g) (dashed) from Example 4.1.
We are going to address this question in the next section, where our goal is to single out a class of games with McNaughton functions for which finitely supported optimal strategies exist.
Existence and computation of finitely supported mixed strategy equilibria
As a point of departure, notice that the optimal strategies in the games discussed above can be chosen so that the players select the pure strategies only from those points that are projections of the vertices V ( f ). Recalling the notation from (2), this means that the supports of such optimal strategies are contained in the sets X f and Y f , respectively. It turns out that there is a class of McNaughton functions with a special geometric structure that makes it possible to directly recover finite mixed strategies.
Let f ∈ M 2 and let P( f ) be the complex of linear regions of f . Without loss of generality, we assume that the elements of vertex projections X f and Y f are
respectively, where the natural numbers p, q ≥ 2. The orthogonal grid of f is the polyhedral complex G( f ) such that
The motivation for the introduction of the grid G( f ) is to investigate whether function f is linear over the line segments 
where x i and y j are as in (6) . We will show that (μ * , ν * ) ∈ 2 is a finitely supported Nash equilibrium in the game Γ f .
First, we have to show that the inequality
is true for every choice of pure strategy x ∈ [0, 1]. Clearly, the inequality 
For each j = 1, . . . , q, the line segment with endpoints (x i , y j ) and (x i+1 , y j ) is included in some polytope A j ∈ P( f ). As the function f is linear over A j , the last sum in (9) becomes
where the inequality follows from (8) . This proves (7) . The proof that ν * is an optimal strategy for the second player is completely analogous and we skip it. 2
Observe that in the proof we have not used the assumption about the integer values of linear coefficients of McNaughton function f . Hence the theorem holds true even for piecewise linear continuous functions with real coefficients. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we have always assumed that there are only two players in the game and that the game is strictly competitive, i.e., the sum of players' payoffs remains constant for all strategy choices. These conditions can be relaxed so that the results obtained above remain unchanged even for finitely many players 1, . . . ,m and piecewise linear continuous payoff functions f 1 , . . . , f m . We will formulate this precisely-the proof is, however, only an inessential modification of the proof of Theorem 4.2. The proof of Theorem 4.2 provides an algorithm for finding Nash equilibria in Γ f . Indeed, once we check that function f satisfies the assumption about the associated grid, it suffices to recover the equilibria in a finite matrix constant-sum game, which is a standard task solved by linear programming [21, Chapter III].
Not every game Γ f meets the condition of Theorem 4.2-see Example 4.1. Even in such cases, however, finite optimal strategies may exist. ), (1, 1) , ), (1, 0) ,
The game Γ f meets the assumptions of [16, Theorem 1] , where the payoff function of Player 1 is supposed to be convex, the game is constant-sum and hence the payoff function of Player 2, which is ¬ f = 1 − f , is concave. This implies that there exists a pair of optimal strategies (μ * , y) such that the support of measure μ * has at most two elements and y ∈ [0, 1] is a pure strategy of Player 2.
In the next example we show that there are games with McNaughton functions for which both the condition of Theorem 4.2 and [16, Theorem 1] fail. Example 4.5. Consider the function g from Example 4.1. It is easy to see that at least one line segment in G(g) is not fully contained in one of the polytopes of P(g). Moreover, the one-variable functions g(x, .) and g(., y) are neither convex nor concave and thus [16, Theorem 1] does not apply to this case. We may, however, routinely verify that the optimal mixed strategy for each player is 1 2 (δ 0 + δ 1 ).
Conclusions
Our aim was to characterize the class of strategic games with McNaughton payoffs which have a finitely supported Nash equilibrium. We have shown that existence of an orthogonal grid is a sufficient condition for finite equilibria and we have proposed an algorithm for recovering the corresponding equilibrium strategies. Our result can easily be generalized to n-player strategic games which do not need to be strictly competitive with payoff functions represented by piecewise linear functions with real coefficients. Proving/disproving the conjecture about existence of finitely supported strategies for every McNaughton function remains the main challenge and we leave it for future investigations. In our future research we would also like to explore the relationships of the strategic games we proposed to the background logic. It is, for example, easy to see that games with monotone McNaughton payoff functions correspond to the formulas without negation and implication, and always have an equilibrium payoff of 0 or 1. The question is whether there are any other classes of formulas such that the corresponding games have a specific form of equilibria.
